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Stephen Utz*
Taxes and the 2008 US Election
The 2008 election will give the US a new President and could,
in theory, replace the whole House of Representatives and
one-third of the Senate. Barack Obama's promised "Change"
will occur, no matter what happens.
This is true not only for the glamour fields of oil prices and war
but also for taxation. Two overarching reasons to expect tax re-
vision are the country's excessively large national debt and the
tax gap. The tax gap is the difference between the income re-
ported by US taxpayers and their actual income. The Treasury
Department estimates that perhaps 20% more in taxes would
be collected, if current law were enforced. Ordinary voters
are hearing more and more about this, which moves the pro-
blem of collecting the missing taxes to the front of the political
stage. The second overarching reason, our record-breaking
national debt, has various consequences - it keeps the dol-
lar weak, raises the need for more revenue to pay interest on
the debt, but also inflates the dollar, thereby reducing the real
cost of the debt service. The most pressing consequence for the
White House and Congress is that the unusual size of the debt
makes borrowing more difficult. (The amount of US govern-
ment debt held by foreign governments also threatens to beco-
me a political issue, though it is not especially a tax issue.) The
2008 electoral winners will therefore be more comfortable if
they can borrow less, so they may try to close the tax gap.
Several other politically powerful reasons for tax revision
come to mind. (1) Another kind of gap, the difference between
the highest incomes and the majority of middle class incomes,
will make it tempting, at least for a strong Democratic ma-
jority, to raise taxes on the high end, either by rolling back
President Bush's reduction of the tax rate on the highest in-
comes or by targeting corporate executives' and private equity
fund managers' compensation. (2) Growing popular suspicion
of offshore corporate transactions creates pressure for extend-
ing US taxation to outbound investment. (3) The increasingly
broad application of the alternative minimum tax (or AMT) for
individuals may prompt some of several possible responses,
but the front-runner is to exempt lower incomes, which could
benefit not only US taxpayers but also foreign individual in-
vestors who have "effectively connected trade or business in-
come" in the US. (4) In hard economic times Congress has
regularly grantedfaster writeoffs for business property, which
effectively lowers business tax rates; the recently passed 2008
economic stimulus legislation contains some of this and we
can expect more. (5) Although only technocrats use the term
economic rent, widespread distress at the high price of gaso-
line, fuel oil, and prescription drugs puts pressure on Congress
to impose higher taxes on the profits of those who supply them.
(6) Tax breaks for energy conservation and environmental
protection already exist, but these have become a playground
for lobbyists - ethanol, fuel cells - and a correction may be
coming. The list could go on, but these seem to me to be the
principal tax issues for 2009.
Broadly speaking, many, if not all, of the items on my list have
an international dimension, which I will emphasize in my
comments today.
In order to understand the politics of U.S. federal taxation, it
is useful to know roughly who bears the tax burden. Here are
some broad statistics. Almost 70% of total federal tax revenues
come from withheld income tax on employees.' Commenta-
tors often mention that those individuals with higher adjusted
gross incomes (the top 5%) pay higher effective income tax
rates,2 but it is also true that these highest AGI earners are not
the individuals with the highest economic incomes, who on
the contrary pay a lower effective rate of tax than the rest of
individual income tax payers.' The numbers are paradoxical,
but they, in part, reflect the extreme levels of (not necessarily
illegal) tax avoidance that the US tax system tolerates. Cor-
porations now pay a relatively small part of total federal tax
revenues - about 12%. Taxes on gifts and trusts account for
less than 3%.
Against this backdrop, presidential campaign promises can
easily be seen to address perceived class concerns over tax
burdens. All three candidates now in the race think that "real"
people (the middle class) should get tax breaks, and only
Barack Obama has specifically mentioned the possibility of
raising taxes on anyone - he has proposed raising the tax rate
on corporate earnings and on most investment gains ("capital
gains" as defined by the US tax code). But presidents rarely
control legislative outcomes. How might party gains and los-
ses in Congress affect tax rates for individuals?
Republican and Democratic majorities would select different
beneficiaries for any new tax measures. If either party has
strong majorities in both Houses of Congress, the politics may
be relatively straightforward. Republicans would preserve
most of the tax cuts of the last eight years, including lower
marginal tax rates for ordinary income, and lower tax rates
for capital gains and dividends. A strong Democratic majority
would probably increase in the highest marginal tax rate but
not the marginal rates for lower incomes; what would happen
to capital gains and dividends is not clear - remember Oba-
ma's proposal. More difficult to predict is the direction of a
weak Democratic or Republican majority in the Senate. If the
parties are strongly antagonistic, it takes more than a simple
majority in the Senate to pass legislation.
Turning from ordinary tax rates to the AMT, all the presidenti-
al candidates promise to reduce or get rid of it. McCain would
like to see it repealed, at a cost he estimates to be about $60
billion a year, and he would allow permanent expensing of all
business property, at a cost he doesn't estimate, but which may
be at least $60 billion a year as well. (It's a good thing these
tax reforms are so inexpensive.) While the major candidates
are all talking about cutting taxes for the middle class, none
has a word to say about related matters like the national debt,
the dollar, and the balance of trade.
* Stephen Utz, Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut School of
Law, Hartford.
I Internal Revenue Service Data Book 2007, Publication 55B, Washington,
DC, issued March 2008, Table I (showing income tax revenue for 2007
to be 50.2% of total federal tax revenues and "withheld" or employee tax
revenues to be 34.5%, or 68.7%).
2 Kyle Mudry & Justin Brian, Individual Income Tax Rates and Shares
2005, at page 39 (IRS Bulletin Article based on IRS Statistics on Income)
- http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05inrate.pdf.
3 Donald Bartlett & James Steele, The Great American Tax Dodge, at 33
(2000)(a polemic against the undertaxation of the super-rich, relying on
IRS Statistics on Income).
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What about corporate and international tax issues? McCain
would cut the corporate tax rate from 35% to 25%. Neither
Obama nor Clinton have spoken on how corporations should
be taxed, apart from comments on flow of corporate income
out of traditional US tax jurisdiction. Frankly, no presidential
candidate has revealed much of an agenda concerning this and
related matters. I will say more about the politics of more spe-
cific corporate and international tax issues, as I discuss them
separately.
None of the presidential candidates has mentioned either of
the two main pressures for tax change, with which I began my
remarks. Let me return to these unpleasant topics now.
The tax gap. Income can escape tax in many ways. Most pro-
minent is the deliberate use of tax shelters- designed for and
sold to corporations by accounting firns, investment banks,
and law firms. In earlier times, tax shelters made use of un-
controversial tax rules to shift losses to individuals who did
have the right to deduct them. More recently, tax shelters have
seemed to twist the rules, though sometimes technically remai-
ning within them. The Justice Department and the IRS seem
to be winning the battle against these, bringing in substanti-
al amounts of missing revenue. While some individuals have
used aggressive tax shelters, which the government also seems
to be cleaning up, outright underreporting (i.e., tax fraud) by
small businesses is huge.4 The electoral winners in 2008 are
not likely to do anything about this because neither political
party can afford to target small business for investigation.
Apart from tax shelters and tax fraud, however, there are other
less clearly illegal, but equally costly, kinds of tax avoidance
Two important strategies available to multi-national corpo-
rations (MNCs) are improper transfer pricing and corporate
inversion.
Transfer pricing (Verrechnungspreise) is the pricing of goods
and services in contracts made between related corporations.
Related entities may all benefit from goods and services avai-
lable to any of them, and the prices in their contracts about
such goods and services are not market prices. So, without
economic effect, transfer pricing can shift income from corpo-
rations in high-tax countries to subsidiaries or related corpora-
tions in low-tax countries. (Note that US tax principles rarely
permit the government to deny the separateness of a corpora-
tion from its shareholders, even if separate corporations are
formed to avoid taxes.) For decades, the US and many of its
trading partners (especially in the OECD) have struggled to
prevent tax-motivated use of transfer pricing, but now agree
that the struggle is failing.'
Corporate inversion - the second corporate strategy that con-
tributes to the tax gap - has been in existence since 2000. Most
US NNCs formaly had corporate holding companies in the
US, and since the US taxes its residents' income worldwide,
foreign branch operations paid US income tax and foreign
subsidiaries were more remotely subject to tax on repatriating
4 The government's most recent estimate is that 80% of the tax gap is due
to understating of income (and not, for example, overstatement of deduc-
tions) by independent business taxpayers. "New IRS Study Provides Pre-
liminary Tax Gap Estimate", IR-2005-38, March 29, 2005 - http://www.
irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id = 137247,00.html.
5 The OECD has struggled for decades to maintain the integrity of the
"arm's length" standard for evaluating transfer pricing between members
of an MNC. The US Treasury has at times criticized the OECD's efforts
and the arm's length standard itself, although US tax regulations have re-
cently been promulgated, which seem to demonstrate a change of heart
on the part of the Treasury - these extensive regulations apparently take
the arm's length standard seriously and spell it out in great detail. Appear-
ances can be deceptive, however, and I do not know whether government
enforcement efforts are proportionate to the apparent regulatory intent.
their earnings. Some MNCs have now begun to replace US
holding companies with holding companies in tax havens like
the Cayman Islands, where there is no corporate income tax.
The income of branches and subs, with a little paperwork, is
thus removed from US tax returns.
Congress and the Bush administration have openly tolerated
corporate inversions. Perhaps they sincerely doubted the im-
portance of the resulting tax loss. What seems at least equally
responsible for falling US corporate tax revenue is that real
business operations are moving overseas, and this, according
to some evidence, shrinks the base even more than corporate
inversions do.
Bush's Tax Cuts and the Public Debt. The Bush tax cuts6 should
be seen in the light of the overall growth of the US public debt
from $5 trillion to $10 trillion during the Bush presidency.7
Although observers on all political sides agree that this is an
important issue with powerful medium and long-term budg-
etary consequences, the nature of the problem gives Congress
many choices. Too many. Some will argue that it is too late to
do anything about the debt, so let's not try. Others will say the
debt justifies removing tax loopholes, and still others will say
it requires lower taxes to stimulate the economy. The public
may become restive, but it takes more than a tremor in the
opinion polls to make Congress act.
Politicians and the public are used to hearing about very big
budgetary pressures that never seem to have any real conse-
quences. Medicare (old-age national health benefits) and Social
Security (our very modest national old-age pension scheme)
cannot be paid for out of the revenues of the existing taxes that
are earmarked to pay for them. But they are politically hot to
handle. So far nothing has been done.
Another predictable budget-busting program is our cycle of
bailouts for economic surprises. When viewed favorably,
these bailouts are sometimes described as stimulus packages.
But the difference between stimulus and unwarranted re-
fund of taxes has become blurred. Reagan's negative corpo-
rate income tax for 1981-83, the bailout of savings and loan
associations in the 1980s, the bailout of US banks that lent
too much to Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil in the 1990s, the
bailout of US airlines after 9/11 - each of these was, at least in
part, a charitable contribution by the government to economic
losers who, by free market standards, should have swallowed
their losses. In each case, of course, the national interest was
the official reason. And in each case, the connection between
the bailout and prospective benefits was too theoretical to be
tested objectively.
The cycle of bailouts as proof of the exceptional optimism of
all concerned, government insiders as well as the public. What
6 President George W. Bush persuaded Congress to cut individual income
taxes twice - in 2002 and 2005. The most important cuts lowered all the
marginal income-tax rates for individuals, ostensibly benefiting people at
all income levels, although the largest tax saving went to taxpayers in
the top 2%. Everyone agrees that the lower tax rates will contribute to
a massive budget deficits, unless spending is also cut or other taxes are
increased. Those least friendly to the rate cuts offer economic analyses
that show them to be unsustainable if nothing else is done. Those friendly
to the rate cuts come up with numbers that show them to be good for the
economy as a whole, but only if the shortfall they caused is met by cuts in
government spending.
7 Nobel Prize Winner Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilnes conclude in their
recently published book The Three Trillion Dollar War that the absolute
size of the debt and the growing costs of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars
threaten the US economy with a downturn as long and deep as that of the
1930s. They claim that the consequences of the public debt may already
be too substantial to be corrected by an end to military involvement in
Afghanistan and Iraq and even the most strenuous fiscal reforms.
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economists call "structural change" in the US economy seems
to occur so often that long-term planning and long-term cauti-
on are discouraged. This of course does not mean that disaster
is not just around the corner. It only means that we will not do
anything to prevent it.
Combining the tax gap and the public debt, I think it is wor-
thwhile to reason as follows: if the US economy were cut off
from the rest of the world, falling tax revenues and a rising
national debt would affect US taxpayers alone: corporate
shareholders, suppliers and employees. It might not be a zero-
sum game, because the benefit might not offset the loss to
the country resulting from an underfunded government, but it
would be a closed game.
Given that US corporations are not exclusively owned, sup-
plied, or staffed by US residents, falling US corporate tax re-
venues do not exclusively benefit US citizens and residents.'
If the new President and Congress want to restore revenues,
they must either raise taxes on citizens and residents or raise
taxes that at least may fall on non-citizens who are also non-re-
sidents.9 In all places and at all times, governments face some
pressure not to raise taxes on the people who elect them. In
the US, the political cost of raising taxes on citizens is espe-
cially high just now, because the economic future is in doubt
and because an anti-tax movement has a lot of middle-class
supporters.
Does it follow that post-election change will include higher
taxes on foreign investors in the ailing US economy? Politi-
cally, this seems possible. But the cost of discouraging foreign
investment is high too.
A Third Way. The new government and legislature will prefer
to find a third alternative - one that does not tax most US
citizens and residents more heavily but also does not discour-
age investment from abroad. Another choice is to tax corporate
groups that are active in the US on more of their worldwide in-
come. The Constitution does not limit congressional power to
8 Note that the Bush tax cuts were limited to US citizens and residents,
among whom are resident non-citizens. The recent Bush stimulus pack-
age was partly limited to US citizens - the immediate tax rebates were so
limited, although roughly one-third of the dollar value of the tax relief in
question went to US corporations, without restriction as to the citizenship
or residence of their owners. Still, broadly speaking, the benefit of recent
tax cuts has stayed in the US.
9 When we trace the shortfall in tax revenues to its sources, both falling cor-
porate tax revenues and deliberate tax cuts look culpable. The presidential
candidates have said little about any tax issue apart from the tax cuts.
Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama would both scale back Bush's tax cuts
for higher incomes. McCain, who opposed the tax cuts in the first place,
would not keep them. What is really likely to happen? If a Democrat wins,
with a strong majority in both House and Senate, the tax cuts are likely
to be repealed for perhaps the top bracket which now applies only to tax-
able incomes of more than $356,000, in other words, to the highest 1% of
incomes. I would not expect Democrats to increase the marginal rate for
incomes in the $150,000 range, which is a merely comfortable middle-
class income. Other less conspicuous tax cuts could be reduced, such as
the very high exemption for gains on house sales; most housing gains
at the moment are at the high end of the market, so this would also be a
targeted tax increase for high rollers. What about McCain? His fiscal mes-
sage is not easy to understand. At times he seems basically to be a fiscal
conservative and an opponent of special interests; at other times, he seems
less principled and he has promised parts of the Republican base that he
will continue Bush's fiscally liberal pattern, with ample friendliness to-
wards what could be regarded as special business interests. Given all this,
if McCain wins, with a strong Republican majority in Congress, the Bush
tax cuts are likely to remain in place, though some targeted tax cuts of the
past might disappear. If McCain wins and the Democrats have a majority
in either the House or the Senate, the Bush tax cuts may disappear on their
own in 2010 without new legislation. But there would be horse-trading (a
Kuhhandel) because some of those tax cuts affect lower income voters as
well.
tax resident individuals or resident juridical entities that have
certain "minimum contacts" with the country (here, I believe
the term would be a "genuine connection"). How then could
MNCs with US contacts be made to pay more than they do
now?
1. Formulary apportionment (Zerlegung). Both in the Euro-
pean Commission and in US tax circles, there is much talk
just now about what is called formulary apportionment in
the US and Canada. This is an approach to taxing the in-
come of corporations that are active in more than one tax
authority's territory, not by attempting to measure the in-
come of these corporations in each territory, but by mea-
suring their total income in all areas and then apportioning
that tax base among the authorities that have a tax claim on
that income. The apportionment formula may equate the
corporate income to be taxed in a given country with a part
of total income equal to the fraction of the corporation's
employees and/or assets and/or sales that are found in the
country. For example, if Corporation X has worldwide in-
come of $1 billion, and one-fourth of its employees work
in the US, and one-half of its sales are in the US, then a
formula that gives equal weight (one-third each) to number
of employees, total value of assets, and gross amount of
sales, would allow the US to tax 3/12 of the $1 billion in
corporate income at whatever rates the US applies to the
income of a corporation with exclusively US staff, assets,
and sales. Note that transfer pricing becomes irrelevant.
The US subnational states and the provinces of Canada have
both used this approach for about the last 60 years. In the
US the individual states began using it unilaterally, without
agreeing on the elements to be included in the formula, and
hence, playing a potentially competitive game. In Canada,
the federal government imposed formulary apportionment
after WWII, and met no particular opposition in doing so.
It is notable, though, that formulary apportionment in both
paradigm examples was unlikely to induce corporations
to take their business elsewhere, because these tax rates
are inevitably relatively low in comparison with other ta-
xes corporations pay the federal government, and because
subnational taxing authorities in both countries are not
allowed to tax out-of-state corporations in a discriminatory
manner.
Having said this, the US is not likely to adopt a formulary
apportionment approach to the taxation of N4NCs, unless it
can either do so in cooperation with its trading partners or
the MNCs themselves favor it (and they are not likely to do
so if it raises their taxes and tax compliance costs substan-
tially).
Therefore, this promising possibility is not likely to be the
solution to the revenue problems the US faces in the near
term.
2. Abandoning Traditional Tax Respect for the Separateness
of Offshore Corporations with Domestic Ties. Something
less comprehensive that formulary apportionment may
accomplish a similar outcome, arguably at a lower adminis-
trative cost and without irritating our trading partners. The
problem to be addressed has two parts. On the one hand, US
tax laws have long "deferred" tax on the income of foreign
subsidiaries of US companies, waiting for their earnings
to be repatriated before demanding that the earnings be
taxed and allowing credit for foreign taxes already paid. This
policy of deferral has often been questioned, and Subpart
F of the US Tax Code specifically takes away the privilege
DAJV Newsletter 3/2008
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of deferral for certain classes of foreign subsidiary income.
Subpart F focuses on operations that are kept offshore for
no particular business reason - such as keeping oil ship-
ping income in foreign tax havens simply by registering the
ships there and establishing low-cost subsidiaries to own
or lease the ships - and it included the income from these
operations in the income of the US parent corporation. The
spirit of Subpart F is therefore both to ignore the corporate
shell of a foreign subsidiary in selected cases and to select
those cases on the basis of the affinity or kinship between
the offshore operations and the more encompassing do-
mestic operation.
I have mentioned the newer problem of corporate inver-
sions. These involve not foreign subsidiaries but foreign
parents whose US subsidiaries are the true center of world-
wide operations. The underlying problem, however, is
the same. Respect for the corporate shell of an offshore
company is essential to the inversion, and the reason for
disapproving of the strategy is that the offshore operation is
really closely akin to, and indeed part of, the domestic ope-
ration, which is more encompassing than that of the offshore
"parent."
The solution may therefore be to replace Subpart F with a
broader set of tax rules designed to deal with both subsidia-
ries and parents whose operations are close to and subordi-
nate to onshore corporate operations. (Charles Kingson has
proposed something like this)
3. Better Regulation of Transfer Pricing. The OECD and the
US have for years bickered over the workability of a shared
standard for transfer pricing. Transfer pricing is the term
used for the allocation of costs and profits in contracts
within a group of related corporations. In the international
tax context, transfer pricing provides a means of shifting
income from a high- to a low-tax environment. For exam-
ple, X Corp in country A may lower its taxes to be paid
in that country by agreeing to pay more (hence lowering
its income) to related Y Corp in country B, which has a
lower tax rate. The agreed international standard for judg-
ing whether a transfer price is valid is the "arm's length"
(Fremdvergleich) method - as incorporated in the model
OECD double tax treaty; it provides that prices between
related entities should be adjusted to closely approximate
the prices that would be set by unrelated enterprises acting
independently.
Unfortunately, a worldwide decline in corporate tax reve-
nues suggests, as does the long history of disaccord among
those countries that have tried to use the ann's length met-
hod, that it is impractical - at least in a world of complex
MNCs that are willing to take aggressive positions with the
taxing authorities they encounter.
4. Prevention of Earnings Stripping. Some Members of the
European Union protect their corporate tax revenues from
all corporations, not only from MNCs, by trying to pre-
vent earnings stripping. Earnings stripping is a strategy for
avoiding corporate tax. A corporation agrees to pay some
or all of its shareholders "interest" on "debts" the corpora-
tion owes them, roughly in proportion to their ownership
interests in the corporation. Since the interest paid, if it is
properly classified as interest, is deductible from corporate
income, the corporation's income tax is reduced. The own-
ers of the corporation do not suffer, however, because they
receive the earnings of the corporation as interest. This may
be taxable to them, but the effective tax rate (the net tax rate
taking into account the tax at both the corporate level and
the shareholder level) can be lower than the effective tax
rate on declared corporate earnings that are then distributed
to shareholders.
At the moment, the US has a relatively toothless tax rule
against earnings stripping. The details of this provision,
Code § 1630), are not very important, beyond the fact that
it is directed only against the distribution of earnings dis-
guised as interest to a 10% or greater shareholder in the
payor corporation. Most corporations that are subject to the
corporate tax in the US are publicly traded and not closely
held. It is extremely rare for one of them to have any share-
holders with a 10% or higher interest. Hence, § 1630) may
almost never apply to these highly visible corporations.
One can only speculate about the extent to which priva-
te equity funds hold large positions in US corporations
that are subject to the corporate tax. Since private equity
funds are usually LLCs, their investors are treated as own-
ing whatever the fund owns in proportion to their interests
in the fund. Hence, a more than 10% investor in a private
equity fund that controls a US corporation could trigger the
earnings stripping rule, if that investor were paid interest.
(There are other requirements for the application of the
rule, but I ignore them here.) I do not know whether this
actually happens, but I do know that many private equi-
ty fund investors hold smaller than 10% interests. Indeed,
that seems to be a pattern, and it may reflect the threat of
§ 1630).
Another aspect of the earnings stripping mechanism de-
serves mention here. US international tax rules exempt
from US taxation all most interest paid to non-resident indi-
viduals that are not US citizens or to non-resident corpora-
tions. This so-called portfolio interest exemption primar-
ily benefits passive investors who are citizens of countries
with which the US does not have double-tax treaties, be-
cause these treaties usually give the right to tax interest to
the country of which the person receiving the interest is a
national.
The portfolio interest exemption does not remove the tax
from the corporation paying that interest, if the interest is
subject to section 1630). Section 1630) denies the corpo-
ration a deduction that would normally be available for in-
terest paid. In other words, it makes the interest taxable to
the corporation paying it. If the deduction were formally
denied for interest payments to domestic and non-domestic
taxpayers alike, it might still disfavor interest payments to
foreign investors to a greater extent than it would to domes-
tic investors, but that would depend on who the investors
happen to be. It seems possible that US investors through
stock markets are much less likely to hold a 10% (or a 5%
or a 2%) stake in a US corporation than are private investors
in US corporations through private equity funds. Hence, it
is possible that foreign investors might implicitly be targe-
ted and more heavily burdened by lowering the threshold
for limiting the interest deduction to thinly capitalized US
corporate taxpayers.
If Congress wanted to raise tax revenues quickly, it could
do so by lowering the threshold from 10% to, say, 5% -
at least if there are private equity fund investors who hold
stakes as large as this. The private equity fund market could
quickly adjust, and existing private equity funds might
be able to adjust as well, though at considerable cost in
management and legal expense, which might have to come
out of the managers' "carried interests."
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One would have to know much more in order to evaluate
the revenue potential of this move. And no one perhaps
knows what other consequences would follow.
One unknown is the extent to which sovereign wealth
fund investments in the US might be affected. These funds
helped investment banks and commercial banks to recover
from the effects of the subprime mortgage crisis, and many
now hold very large minority positions in these financial
institutions. If interest payments to them on further loans
were not deductible, the result would not only be to reduce
the value of the payments to these funds but also to reduce
earnings of the payor corporations to the detriment of all
shareholders, foreign and domestic.
Another unknown relates to US pension funds, which are
large investors in private equity funds, and while they can
benefit from earning stripping, the benefit remains in the
US and must almost certainly be taxed when pensioners re-
ceive their retirement money. But uncertainty in the private
equity fund market could reduce the value of pension funds
holdings, perhaps drastically. We have just experienced the
contagious effect of uncertainty in financial markets with
the subprime mortgage crisis.
In summary, tightening the interest deduction for thinly
capitalized US corporations might produce substantial tax
revenue, but the consequences are not easily foreseen with-
out a great deal of specific information about the recipients
of the interest payments in question, and even then, it is
largely the identity of the corporate payors that we should
be concerned about. If they are important players in the US
economy, we may not want to make it harder for them to
attract investment from abroad.
This concludes my survey of possible US legislative strate-
gies for raising specifically corporate tax revenue. In brief,
the most attractive strategies are those that extend the ap-
plication of US taxes to non-US corporations by taxing the
groups to which they belong. These include formulary ap-
portionment and the more limited strategy of taxing corpo-
rate groups with substantive links to the US, even if they
do not meet the traditional requirements for residence. Both
strategies would have to be reconciled with US treaty obli-
gations.
What then should we expect from the combination of a new
President and a possible change in the partisan balance of
Congress? As I have summed up the forces at work on the
legislative agenda, more tax cuts seem unlikely, and even
the extension of the Bush tax cuts is less likely than not,
without a major Republican win in both legislative houses.
Neither party is plausibly seen as standing for fiscal restraint
in other respects. Still, the government officials who do
look at the numbers are likely to capture the attention of the
new Congress by pointing out that borrowing will not come
easy, and that higher debt will do nothing to help trade or
the threatened recession. The public does not like the idea
of US corporate wealth escaping taxes, so a globalization of
the corporate tax base may have enough momentum to win
bi-partisan support - I would suggest that if it does, this will
take the form of a new version of Subpart F, as previously
described. I doubt that any combination of party majorities
and minorities in the Congress will lead to explicitly higher
tax on investment from abroad. The carried interests of
private equity funds, however, will be a tempting target for
the tax harvest.
IABA / DAJV Symposium in Honor of the 100th Birthday of
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. (mult.) Stefan A. Riesenfeld (1908 - 1999)
This year, the annual reunion of the International Association
of Boalt Alumni (IABA) was held in Cologne on the week-
end of June 6 - 8, 2008. Organized by Dr. Martin Schulte
(LL.M. 1990), the event brought together more than 50 alum-
ni of Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California
at Berkeley and their spouses. Guests travelled to Cologne
from as far as Japan, Australia, Peru and Berkeley, but also
from a number of European countries.
On Friday, June 6, 2008, IABA and DAJV co-sponsored a
symposium with lectures in honor of Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. (mult.)
Stefan A. Riesenfeld (1908 -1999) whose 1001' birthday was
celebrated two days later.
After the opening of the session by Dr. Martin Schulte, Prof.
Dr. Stephan Hobe, substituting for Dean Prof. Dr. Michael
Sachs, welcomed the guests on behalf of the Cologne law
faculty. The University of Cologne had kindly made availa-
ble its finest lecture hall, the Neue Senatssaal, for the lectures
in honor of Stefan Riesenfeld, who held an honorary doc-
torate from the law faculty.
Following these welcome remarks, Dr. Hans-Peter Ackmann
(LL.M. 1986 and Past President of DAJV) gave an outline
of Riesenfeld's life and academic achievements. The three
speeches delivered by faculty members of the Cologne law
faculty (Prof. Dr. Stephan Hobe) and of Boalt Hall (Prof. Dr.
David Caron and Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Richard Buxbaum) were
devoted to legal topics that would certainly have been of in-
terest to Stefan Riesenfeld.
The lectures which are printed below were met with much
interest by participants of the IABA reunion as well as the
DAJV membership with about 90 attending. The sympo-
sium ended with a reception which gave participants a wel-
come opportunity to relive their own personal Riesenfeld
memories and share the many anecdotes about this German-
American legal genius.
Dr. Martin Schulte, LL.M. (Univ. of California, Berkeley)
Rechtsanwalt (K6ln)/Attorney-at-Law (NY)
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